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I. Introduction 
This Essay advances a simple thesis: Corporate governance 
is best seen not as a subset of economics, or even law, but instead 
a subset of moral psychology.  
                                                                                                     
  Howard L. Oleck Professor of Business Law, School of Law, Wake 
Forest University. I wish to thank Chris Bruner for inviting me to the Law 
Review’s Symposium honoring Lyman Johnson and David Millon—even though 
I am on the periphery of “progressive corporate law scholarship.” I wish to thank 
Lyman and David for their friendship for so many years and for their 
willingness (I am confident) to be “involuntary subjects” in this inquiry into 
corporate moral matrices. I owe a special debt of gratitude to McNair Nichols 
and Jenna Lorence, who teamed up to offer many thoughtful editorial 
suggestions and track down citations to my sophomoric understanding of moral 
psychology. Finally, I owe a special debt to Austin Thompson (’17) for his 
research help and insightful comments on this foray outside the law into human 
morality. 
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Corporate governance—that is, the decision-making and 
actions that arise from the dynamic relationship of investors and 
management in corporations—is not the product of rational 
economic incentives or prescriptive legal norms, but instead the 
product of moral values. On questions of right and wrong in the 
corporation, these moral values operate within the almost 
unbounded discretion afforded to corporate investors (primarily 
shareholders) and to corporate management (primarily directors 
and officers). The many decisions that these corporate actors 
make, like those of other human actors, are essentially emotive 
and instinctive. The justifications offered by corporate actors for 
their choices—whether resting on theories of shareholder 
primacy, team production, board primacy, or even corporate 
social responsibility—are after-the-fact rationalizations, not 
reasoned thinking.  
That is, those of us who seek to understand corporate 
governance have largely been co-opted by the Western 
philosophical belief in human rationality. Beginning with 
Socrates and Plato, moving through Descartes and the 
Enlightenment, and culminating in Law and Economics, we have 
explained human decision-making as constructive thinking 
leading to rational action. But recent research in the nascent area 
of moral psychology suggests that we are not rational, 
particularly when we operate in social and political groups.1 Our 
decisions (moral judgments) arise in our subconscious, out of 
rational view. This may be particularly so when we operate in the 
super-organism that is the corporation, where our specialized 
roles lead to almost unparalleled human cooperation.  
While we have assumed that economic incentives and law 
play a determinative role in shaping culture and thus the moral 
matrix of our decision-making, it may be that things are the other 
way around. Moral decisions arise not from reasoned responses to 
human situations, but instead are driven by subconscious, 
emotive, and irrational factors. We rationalize our moral 
decisions—whether to feel compassion toward another who is 
harmed, to desire freedom in the face of coercion, or to honor 
                                                                                                     
 1. See generally, Jonathan Haidt, The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology, 
316 SCI. 998 (2007). 
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those things we consider sacred—after we have made the 
decision. We layer on a veneer of rationality, to reassure 
ourselves of our own moral integrity and to signal our moral 
values to others in our group who share our moral views. And we 
choose our groups with great (subconscious) care.  
Thus, the moral matrices—which in our political society have 
become molded into progressive, conservative, and libertarian 
camps—provide a powerful prism by which to understand 
decisions in the corporate context. When presented with a 
question of whether to move operations offshore, at the apparent 
expense of local workers, what moral vectors guide (if not compel) 
the board’s decision? When presented with a proposal that the 
company report to shareholders on lobbying and political 
expenditures, so as to make corporate managers more answerable 
to shareholders with respect to corporate political activities, what 
moral vectors guide shareholder votes? When faced with a 
decision to leave fossil fuels in the ground or to extract their 
immediate value, what guides the corporation’s temporal 
horizon?  
Although both directors and shareholders—indeed, all of 
us—will offer a host of motivated reasoning—even a dizzying 
plethora of after-the-fact rationalizations—for decisions on these 
and other essentially moral business questions, the proffered 
reasons should not be understood as the drivers. They are mere 
echoes (sometimes distorted) of the moral forces that actually 
drove the decision. For all meaningful corporate decisions, which 
in the end are all laden with questions of right and wrong, moral 
psychology teaches us that there is—almost certainly—
machinery that is deeper, nearly invisible, that motivates the 
corporate actor’s decision. 
My purpose in this Essay is twofold. First, I sketch the recent 
research in the field of moral psychology that seeks to answer the 
great philosophical question: When we make moral judgments, 
are we rational or emotional? The emerging answer is at once 
disturbing and liberating. We are emotional, analogical beings, 
and what we say about our decisions—think, legal analysis—is 
mostly a set of shadows on the wall. These studies reveal that we 
are moved—in different proportions—by a sense of compassion, 
fairness, freedom, loyalty, order, and sanctity. Lately, how we 
hold these proportions has defined our political camps, with 
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progressives moved by the moral vectors of caring and 
fairness/equality; conservatives moved by these same moral 
vectors, as well as those related to loyalty, order, and sanctity; 
and libertarians moved especially by the moral vector of freedom.  
Second, in the spirit of the symposium honoring the work of 
David Millon and Lyman Johnson, I take a shot at applying these 
insights to corporate governance—that is, to how moral decisions 
happen in the corporation. I start by positing the story of a 
corporate moral decision—specifically, whether a corporate board 
should approve moving the company’s possibly unhealthy 
manufacturing offshore. I then consider how the story implicates 
the moral values identified by moral psychology: compassion, 
fairness, freedom, loyalty, order, and sanctity. To do this, I 
extract the moral vectors implicit in the recent writings on 
corporate governance by David and Lyman—writings that state 
(and thus reflect) how each of them approaches moral judgments 
in the corporation. Their various arguments for greater pluralism 
in the corporation, for a broader set of corporate duties, and even 
for the sanctity of the corporation as an instrument of social 
welfare reflect a set of “moral matrices.” In the end, it’s difficult 
to predict how David and Lyman would each resolve the tough 
choices facing a board of directors in a corporate offshoring 
decision. 
II. Moral Psychology 
To better understand decisions within the corporation—and 
thus corporate governance—it is useful to turn to the relatively 
nascent field of moral psychology and the structures undergirding 
moral judgments that research in this field has identified.2 Over 
the past couple decades, studies and experiments have revealed 
that our moral judgments and discourse arise from moral 
matrices that mix and match at least six fundamental moral 
                                                                                                     
 2. See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE 
DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION, xii (2012) (“Politics and religion are both 
expressions of our underlying moral psychology, and an understanding of that 
psychology can help bring people together.”). 
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values that can be expressed as opposites, each along a separate 
axis:3  
1) care / harm  
2) fairness / cheating  
3) liberty / oppression  
4) loyalty / betrayal  
5) authority / subversion  
6) sanctity / degradation  
According to these studies, we make moral judgments by 
weighting these values in different ways—often in ways that are 
closely aligned with our identification with different political 
groups.4 In this country, political liberals are moved almost 
exclusively by the values of caring/compassion and 
fairness/equality, with adherents feeling strong (even visceral) 
reactions against narratives of harm and inequality.5 Meanwhile, 
political conservatives are moved by the additional values of 
sanctity, authority/order, and loyalty, with adherents 
experiencing strong reactions against narratives involving 
desecration, disrespect, and disloyalty.6 And political libertarians 
are moved primarily by the value of liberty/freedom, with strong 
                                                                                                     
 3. See Jesse Graham, Jonathan Haidt & Brian A. Nosek, Liberals and 
Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations, 96 J. PERSONALITY 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1029, 1029–46 (2009) (finding that conservatives tended to value 
five matrix values while liberals tended to prefer care and fairness over loyalty, 
sanctity, and authority). 
 4. See id. at 1031 (“[W]e found that liberals showed evidence of a morality 
based primarily on the individualizing foundations (Harm/care and 
Fairness/reciprocity), whereas conservatives showed a more even distribution of 
values, virtues, and concerns, including the two individualizing foundations and 
the three binding foundations (Ingroup/loyalty, Authority/respect, and 
Purity/sanctity).”). 
 5. See id. at 1040 (explaining that liberals are primarily moved by harm 
and fairness concerns); HAIDT, supra note 2, at 295 (“The left builds its moral 
matrix . . . most firmly and consistently on the Care foundation.”).  
 6. See Graham et al., supra note 3, at 1040 (explaining that conservative 
moral concerns are more evenly distributed across harm, fairness, loyalty, 
authority, and sanctity); HAIDT, supra note 2, at 306 (“[W]e have found that 
social conservatives have the broadest set of moral concerns, valuing all six 
foundations relatively equally . . . [with] relatively high settings on the Loyalty, 
Authority, and Sanctity foundations . . . .”). 
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reactions against government (or other) restrictions on individual 
freedom and free markets.7  
The following schematics from Haidt’s The Righteous Mind8 
identify the different weights these moral values hold for 




Further, as each group self-reinforces its own value matrix, 
the group’s views are purified and harden as they “bind” and then 
become “blind” to the other.9 Thus, each political camp—which for 
the past fifty years has become more compartmentalized and 
purer—is built upon a set of heuristics that constitute the camp’s 
                                                                                                     
 7. See HAIDT, supra note 2, at 300 (“Libertarians are the direct 
descendants of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Enlightenment 
reformers who fought to free people and markets from the control of kings and 
clergy. Libertarians love liberty; that is their sacred value.”).  
 8. See id. at 297 fig.12.2, 302 fig.12.3, 306 fig.12.4 (depicting the weight of 
moral values that groups of Americans with differing ideologies possess).  
 9. See id. at 313 (“Morality binds and blinds. It binds us into ideological 
teams . . . . It blinds us to the fact that each team is composed of good 
people . . . .”). 
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moral matrix.10 For progressives, the defining account is 
“oppressed versus protected,” using narratives that value 
compassion and fairness in a struggle against hatred and 
inequality.11 For conservatives, the defining account is 
“traditional versus radical,” built on narratives that value 
ordered authority built on deeply-held (often religious) views.12 
For libertarians, the defining account is “free markets versus 
regulatory intervention,” using narratives of individual and 
collective liberty struggling against the tyranny of regulatory 
(public and private) intrusion and coercion.13  
Using different narratives, moral psychologists have gauged 
the moral responses and attitudes held by adherents to each 
group.14 Thus, members of different groups react strongly and 
differently to moral narratives:15  
 
                                                                                                     
 10. See id. at 318 (“We are deeply intuitive creatures whose gut feelings 
drive our strategic reasoning. This makes it difficult—but not impossible—to 
connect with those who live in other matrices, which are often built on different 
configurations of the available moral foundations.”). 
 11. See id. at 283–85 (describing the prototypical liberal narrative which 
hinges on overcoming oppression and achieving fairness and equality). 
 12. See id. at 285–86 (describing the prototypical conservative narrative 
which focuses on preservation of traditional values). 
 13. See id. at 300–02 (describing libertarian preference for free markets 
and liberty and suspicion of government intervention). 
 14. See id. at 301 (“[W]e analyzed dozens of surveys completed by 12,000 
libertarians and we compared their responses to those of tens of thousands of 
liberals and conservatives.”). 
 15. Haidt has described the libertarian “moral matrix” as follows: 
We found that libertarians look more like liberals than like 
conservatives on most measures of personality (for example, both 
groups score higher than conservatives on openness to experience, 
and lower than conservatives on disgust sensitivity and 
conscientiousness). On the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, 
libertarians join liberals in scoring very low on the Loyalty, 
Authority, and Sanctity foundations. Where they diverge from 
liberals most sharply is on two measures: the Care foundation, where 
they score very low (even lower than conservatives), and on some new 
questions we added about economic liberty, where they scored 
extremely high (a little higher than conservatives, a lot higher than 
liberals). 
Id.  
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Fig. 2 
 
Political group Narrative  Values 
Progressive “A man walks down a sidewalk 
and kicks a dog sleeping on the 
side of the sidewalk.” 
Caring, fairness 
Conservative “A woman finds an old 
American flag in her attic and 





Libertarian “A parent, whose gambling 
hurts their family, is jailed for 
being a compulsive gambler.” 
Liberty 
 
The studies on how people react to these and similar stories 
reveal that our moral views are mostly emotive, even 
instinctual.16 Human decision-making appears to arise from two 
cognitive systems: System One is quick and intuitive, and System 
Two is slow and considered.17 Recent studies indicate that our 
moral positions arise through System One and then are explained 
and defended by System Two, which seems to engage in 
“motivated reasoning” (think of a zealous, close-minded defense 
lawyer) rather than “constructive reasoning” (think of an 
objective, fair-minded judge).18 
                                                                                                     
 16. Daniel Kahneman offers a quite plausible account of how we reach 
decisions, moral and otherwise:  
The spontaneous search for an intuitive solution sometimes fails—
neither an expert solution nor a heuristic answer comes to mind. In 
such cases we often find ourselves switching to a slower, more 
deliberate and effortful form of thinking. This is the slow thinking of 
the title. Fast thinking includes both variants of intuitive thought—
the expert and the heuristic—as well as the entirely automatic 
mental activities of perception and memory, the operations that 
enable you to know there is a lamp on your desk or retrieve the name 
of the capital of Russia. 
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 13 (2012). 
 17. See id. at 20–21 (describing Systems One and Two—the dual systems 
by which humans make snap judgments and calculated decisions). 
 18. See id. at 21 (“The automatic operations of System 1 generate 
surprisingly complex patterns of ideas, but only the slower System 2 can 
construct thoughts in an orderly series of steps.”). 
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That is, our explanations (rationalizations) come only after 
arriving at a moral conclusion about a given moral situation. 
Thus, these studies address and answer the age-old question of 
whether we are essentially rational beings who sometimes must 
tame our emotions, or whether we are emotional beings who use 
reason to justify our actions and beliefs.19 The resounding answer 
from the studies is that we are emotional beings who come to 
moral views based on a moral matrix that we are often unaware 
of and that we often take from the moral group to which we are 
aligned.20 And only after coming to a moral conclusion do we then 
rationalize our view by resorting to the language sets provided by 
the group, drawing from its fundamental moral values.  
The studies also suggest that value matrices tend to harden 
into psychological attitudes.21 For example, conservatives tend to 
like order and predictability (both attributes of tradition and 
authority), while liberals tend to like variety and diversity (both 
attributes of tolerance and liberty).22 Thus, when shown dots 
moving on a screen, conservatives prefer the images of dots 
moving in lock step, while liberals prefer random motion.23 
In addition, liberals tend to be universalists who view people 
everywhere in the world as relevant to their moral equation, 
while conservatives are more focused on people in their country 
or their self-defined communities. Therefore, political policies 
aimed to improve the lives of people generally in the world 
resonate with liberals, while those same policies presented to 
conservatives have less salience and suggest disloyalty to one’s 
own. 
                                                                                                     
 19.  See id. at 89 (“[B]asic assessments play an important role in intuitive 
judgment, because they are easily substituted for more difficult questions—this 
is the essential idea of the heuristics and biases approach.”). 
 20. See id. at 313 (discussing the impact of a “moral matrix”). 
 21. See HAIDT, supra note 2, at 368 (“Our minds contain a toolbox of 
psychological systems, including the six moral foundations, which can be used to 
meet those challenges and construct effective moral communities.”). 
 22. See id. at 300–06 (discussing liberal and conservative ideals). 
 23. See Jonathan Haidt: The Psychology Behind Morality, ON BEING WITH 
KRISTA TIPPETT (June 12, 2014), https://www.onbeing.org/programs/jonathan-
haidt-the-psychology-behind-morality/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (describing the 
study in an interview) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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Likewise, the studies suggest liberals are more open to new 
experiences, while conservatives have trouble assimilating the 
unknown.24 That is, liberals exhibit the trait of being willing to 
accept and accommodate to change, while conservatives are 
skeptical of change and prefer the predictability of tradition.  
In short, it turns out that the abiding faith in human 
rationality as the basis to moral judgments—from Socrates and 
Plato, to Descartes and the Enlightenment, to the Rule of Law 
and even Law and Economics—may be wrong. The notion that we 
decide moral questions of right/wrong (most everything) through 
rational processes is mostly hogwash.  
III. The Moral Matrices of David Millon and Lyman Johnson 
Moral psychology thus suggests that, though we each carry 
and make moral decisions based on our own moral matrix, our 
moral judgments are formed by moral values shared and refined 
by our tribal groups.25 The natural question for those interested 
in corporate governance seems obvious: How does moral 
psychology play out in the boardroom?  
If this were a law Article, I would attempt a study using the 
tools of moral psychology to assess how actual corporate decisions 
are made—a highly useful, but daunting task.26 But because this 
                                                                                                     
 24. See HAIDT, supra note 2, at 300–06 (analyzing liberal and conservative 
values). 
 25. As Haidt points out: 
We humans have a dual nature—we are selfish primates who long to 
be part of something larger and nobler than ourselves. We are 90 
percent chimp and 10 percent bee. If you take that claim 
metaphorically, then the groupish and hivish things that people do 
will make a lot more sense. It’s almost as though there’s a switch in 
our heads that activates our hivish potential when conditions are just 
right. 
Id. at 255. 
 26. In fact, the “paper” I presented at the Symposium on October 21, 2016, 
included the preliminary results of my research on boardroom attention to 
sustainability and other environmental, social, and governance (ESG) matters. I 
found a small, but perceptible, increase in corporate ESG focus—findings that 
are in line with studies cited by Millon and Johnson. See, e.g., Millon, infra note 
32, at 26–28 (describing greater attention to ESG factors by “mainstream 
institutional shareholders”).  
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is an Essay for a law Symposium celebrating David Millon and 
Lyman Johnson, I will assume the latitude to attempt a profile of 
their corporate moral matrices. As self-proclaimed “progressive 
corporate legal scholars,”27 they would seem to be appropriate 
subjects for this first ever speculation on how moral values might 
play out in corporate decisions. I do this—applying not the 
methods of moral psychology, but rather the methods of legal 
textual analysis—by attempting to reconstruct their corporate 
governance views along the six identified moral values of modern 
moral psychology.28 
A moral story. I begin my inquiry into the moral matrices of 
Millon and Johnson, as reflected in their recent writings on 
corporate governance, by framing a moral story as an instrument 
to tease out the moral matrix for each of them. Here is the story:  
Management of a large multinational corporation 
recommends to the company’s board of directors that the board 
approve a move of the company’s manufacturing facilities from 
                                                                                                     
Looking at the 10-K annual reports by companies in the S&P 100, I found 
that, while only fifty-seven companies in 2015 mentioned sustainability or 
climate change as relevant to their business, this was up from forty-one 
companies in 2010. Corporate disclosures on average moved from “mere 
mention” of these matters in 2010 to “some discussion” in 2015. The picture is 
similar in annual SEC-filed proxy statements, where thirty-one companies in 
2015 disclosed that their boards or board committees have responsibility to 
consider ESG matters (many with a new standing committee charged with the 
task), up from nineteen in 2010. A similarly small but upward trend also 
appears in the linkage between executive pay and ESG performance measures. 
While in 2010 only four of S&P 100 had this link, the number grew to eight in 
2015, with sustainable, responsible, impact (SRI) performance moving in these 
companies from a “mere mention” to a “factor” in setting executive pay. 
These ESG trends reflected in corporate disclosures and apparent 
boardroom attention are encouraging. Extrapolating from the 2010–2015 trends, 
I estimated that by 2024 all S&P 100 companies will be disclosing the relevance 
of ESG to their business, by 2027 all will have board committees focused on 
ESG, and by 2033 all will link executive pay to ESG performance. At the current 
pace, it will not be until 2070 that all of the S&P 100 will have adopted ESG as 
a core business purpose. 
 27. See, e.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David K. Millon, Corporate Law After 
Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 1 (2015) [hereinafter Johnson & Millon, Hobby 
Lobby] (arguing that the Court is correct in finding that business corporations 
should not limit themselves solely to the pursuit of profit).  
 28. See infra Parts III.A–F (examining the corporate perspectives of Lyman 
Johnson and David Millon on a number of topics). 
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the United States to Ruranesia. Management has learned of 
preliminary medical studies suggesting that a chemical used in 
the company’s manufacturing process is a carcinogen. To avoid 
potential trouble with OSHA and liability to exposed workers, 
management says that the company can take advantage of the 
more lax workplace standards of Ruranesia. Manufacturing costs 
will also be lower in Ruranesia. The directors approve the move, 
citing corporate profits as their reason. 
How would David and Lyman respond to this moral story? Of 
course, we do not really know what would be their instinctive, 
emotive response. And the interesting thing is that they would 
not be able to predict it either, given that our moral judgments 
emanate from the bowels of our unplumbed subconscious.29 
But bear with me. Let me speculate what would be David’s 
and Lyman’s moral response to this story. It is, after all, a 
“corporate governance” story of a board of directors that chooses 
to have the company engage in an off-shoring, legal-arbitrage 
strategy. It thus pits the interests of a variety of corporate 
constituents, some highlighted in the story and others lurking in 
the shadows. As law scholars concerned about the question of the 
“purpose” of the corporation and “to whom” corporate fiduciaries 
should answer,30 the story is right up their alley.  
I undertake my speculation—itself, of course, a moral 
judgment—by looking at three recent Articles by David and by 
Lyman that consider their different perspectives on corporate 
governance, in the process revealing a bit about the motivated 
reasoning each of them has employed to explain their stances on 
corporate governance. And, as interested as I am in how David 
and Lyman might respond to the story that I posit, I also use this 
exercise to discern my own moral matrix and how I respond to 
the story. In fact, maybe the value of the exercise is not really 
about David or Lyman—or even about me. Instead, it is a call to 
each of you who has plodded through to this point to think of your 
                                                                                                     
 29. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 16, at 4 (“The mental work that produces 
impressions, intuitions, and many decisions goes on in silence in our mind.”).  
 30. See generally, e.g., Lyman P. Q. Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of 
Director Care, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 787 (1999); David K. Millon, Redefining 
Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991) [hereinafter Millon, Redefining 
Corporate Law]. 
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own moral matrix—the corporate governance story providing us a 
shared Rorsharch test. 
My sampled Articles. Here are the Articles that I consider:  
David Millon’s Articles: 
 Radical Shareholder Primacy (2013)31 
 Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility, and the 
Redefinition of Corporate Purpose Without Law (2012)32 
 Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility (2011)33 
Lyman Johnson’s Articles: 
 Law and the History of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate 
Governance (2013)34  
 Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment 
Rule, Corporate Purpose (2013)35  
 Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties (2011)36 
In re-reading these writings, I am struck by the many 
differences (sometimes obvious and sometimes subtle) between 
David’s and Lyman’s moral approaches.  
To me, David has the heart of a true progressive; his writings 
reveal great care and concern for fair treatment of those affected 
by the modern corporation.37 At the same time, his moral matrix 
also seems to lead him to consider whether some of these 
                                                                                                     
 31. David K. Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 
1013 (2013) [hereinafter Millon, Shareholder Primacy]. 
 32. David K. Millon, Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility, 
and the Redefinition of Corporate Purpose Without Law, in CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (P.M. Vasudev & Susan Watson eds., 
2012) [hereinafter Millon, Enlightened Shareholder]. 
 33. David K. Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523 (2011) [hereinafter Millon, Two Models of CSR]. 
 34. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibility: 
Corporate Governance, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 974 (2013) [hereinafter Johnson, 
Law and Corporate Responsibility]. 
 35. Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: 
Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405 (2013) 
[hereinafter Johnson, Unsettledness]. 
 36. Lyman P. Q. Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
701 (2011) [hereinafter Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties]. 
 37. See generally Millon, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31; Millon, 
Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32; Millon, Two Models of CSR, supra note 
33. 
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progressive goals might not be accomplished through an 
enlightened corporate freedom in which managers respond to 
market and reputational pressures, thus “to pay attention to 
human rights and environmental norms of good behavior.”38 But 
he has doubts that market-driven freedom—given informational 
limitations, the tendencies of corporate management to cheat, 
and the corporation’s profit-driven motivations—will be sufficient 
to move corporations to “go as [corporate social responsibility 
(CSR)] advocates might they think should.”39 That is, he 
questions the loyalty that corporate managers feel toward the 
financial bottom line, rejects their obedience to a narrowly-
defined profit imperative, and especially disdains their sense that 
the profit motive and our capitalism are sacred.40 Thus, in the 
name of caring and fairness, David disavows fundamental 
libertarian/conservative tenets.41 He may well define the 
corporate progressive! 
Lyman, on the other hand, comes across to me to be more 
multi-dimensional. Although he has joined David on joint projects 
seeking to minimize the oppressive power of corporate 
managers,42 Lyman seems to have a clearer vision of the 
corporation as a moral institution.43 He attaches importance to 
(enforceable) loyalty, built on deep, unstated assumptions of trust 
by those who give their lives and souls (and perhaps money) to 
the corporate enterprise.44 He imagines fiduciary duties, it seems, 
                                                                                                     
 38. Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 45.   
 39. Id. at 46. 
 40. See id. (“Ultimately, corporate management is and will continue to be 
driven by cost-benefit concerns, which means that certain problems will not be 
addressed or prevented if it is not cost-effective to do so.”).  
 41. See id. (arguing that there is a responsibility gap in the way corporate 
management adheres to cost-benefit concerns in dealing with certain problems).  
 42. See, e.g., Johnson & Millon, Hobby Lobby, supra note 27, at 14 (arguing 
that “constituency statutes” empower corporate management to consider 
non-shareholder interests in directing the corporation’s business).  
 43. See infra notes 44–46 and accompanying text (discussing Lyman 
Johnson’s vision of the corporation). 
 44. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 975 
(“Recently, corporate law’s long and unsustainable neglect of corporate 
responsibility concerns has led to the emergence of a new type of business 
corporation, the benefit corporation.” (internal citations omitted)).   
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as a sort of credo for our life in modern business.45 He grounds 
many of his arguments in historic analysis and constitutional 
frameworks, thus revealing the importance he attaches to 
structure and tradition. He also is much clearer in seeing sanctity 
in the human ties that bind us together in the super-organism 
that is the corporation, just as bees assiduously work in various 
ways to make their hive succeed.46 That is, while David may 
sense the sacred in our natural environment, Lyman seems to 
sense it in the corporation, a paradigmatic collaborative human 
enterprise. In the end, Lyman may well be a model corporate 
conservative!  
Next I consider how David and Lyman reflect, in different 
ways and to different extents, the moral values (and opposites) 
identified by moral psychology as relevant to our moral decision-
making.  
A. Caring/Harm 
Both David Millon and Lyman Johnson—reflecting perhaps 
the defining trait of progressive corporate law scholars—would 
have corporate decision makers “care” more about how their 
decisions affect non-shareholders.47 They both proclaim their goal 
of advancing the cause of corporate pluralism—the caring by 
corporate decision makers about a broad spectrum of corporate 
stakeholders.48 They both decry others whose views on corporate 
governance focus on short-term shareholder profits without 
explicit consideration of (caring for) non-investor constituencies.49  
                                                                                                     
 45.  See Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36, at 702 (noting that 
he believes “wholesale waiver of fiduciary duties is objectionable and bad 
policy”). 
 46. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 982 
(showing disdain that the federal incursion into corporate governance focuses 
almost exclusively on stockholder interests).   
 47. See infra notes 48–49 and accompanying text (discussing David 
Millon’s and Lyman Johnson’s views of the corporation).  
 48. See generally Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 
34; Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 33.  
 49. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 989 
(denouncing Professor Lucian Bebchuk for arguing for investor activism without 
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David questions the “radical” version of shareholder primacy, 
in which the only objective of the corporation is shareholder 
wealth maximization—with corporate managers serving as 
agents for a homogeneous body of profit-seeking equity 
investors.50 Instead, David calls for “enlightened shareholder 
value” in which shareholder wealth is understood as “a long-run 
orientation that seeks sustainable growth and profits based on 
responsible attention to the full range of relevant stakeholder 
interests.”51 David’s accounts are inevitably sprinkled with 
“caring” stories of how non-shareholders have suffered at the 
hands of heartless, profit-oriented managers—such as the 1984 
Bhopal disaster, Shell Oil’s activities in the Niger delta, or Nike’s 
use of child labor.52  
Lyman, while espousing what he refers to as “institutional 
pluralism,” as distinguished from the “undesirable monism” of 
shareholder wealth maximization,53 engages much more in the 
language of responsibility.54 In fact, his writings do not focus on 
the specific people for whom corporate governance should be 
concerned.55 For example, the three Articles that I sampled make 
                                                                                                     
considering “the effects on noninvestor constituencies”); Millon, Enlightened 
Shareholder, supra note 33, at 1 (criticizing short-term focus on current share 
price without considering immediate or longer-term negative effects on 
non-shareholders). 
 50. See Millon, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31, at 1014 (“[P]roponents 
of radical shareholder primacy . . . all accept the agency characterization and 
the shareholder wealth maximization injunction.”). 
 51. Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 1.   
 52. See id. at 22–23, 28 (discussing the Bhopal disaster of 1984, Royal 
Dutch Shell PLC’s and its Nigerian subsidiary’s involvement in torture and 
execution, and Nike’s 1992 adoption of a code of conduct that “mandates 
observance of basic labor, health, and safety standards”); see also Millon, Two 
Models of CSR, supra note 33, at 531 (describing Nestle’s entry into milk 
production in the Moga district of India).  
 53. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 409–10 (arguing that 
“[w]ithout a statutory ‘fix,’ or timely clarification by the Delaware Supreme 
Court, Delaware law might be interpreted as imposing an undesirable monism 
of corporate purpose at a time when, in corporate law elsewhere, institutional 
pluralism should be encouraged”).  
 54. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 975 
(decrying neglect of “corporate responsibility concerns”).  
 55. See generally id.; Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35; Johnson, 
Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36. 
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no specific mention of workers, employees, or communities—even 
as he urges that the corporation’s purpose be more pluralistic and 
responsible.56 Perhaps a bit like Charlie Brown’s Linus, Lyman 
may have stronger feelings for mankind than he does for 
individual people.57 But this may also be a sign of his being a true 
conservative—that is, one who recognizes that empathy 
(identifying with another person, as opposed to feeling 
compassion for that person) may lead our emotions astray and 
become a misguided basis for making good policy.58 To Lyman, 
institutions would seem to be more important than individuals. 
So how would David and Lyman respond to my offshoring 
story, at least as it suggests possible harm to workers both in the 
United States and in Ruranesia? David would no doubt call for 
this harm to be factored into the board’s decision, because of the 
potential costs to the company, but also because of pluralistic 
caring that should be woven into all corporate decision-making.59 
Lyman might be less moved by the plight of the workers, possibly 
noticing that it is unclear whether the U.S. workers would prefer 
to keep their jobs in the face of the potential health risks, and 
whether the Ruranesia workers might be delighted to accept the 
risks in exchange for the new employment.60 
Perhaps not surprisingly, absent from David’s and Lyman’s 
thinking on the pluralistic corporation is any sense of compassion 
for the shareholders whose financial destinies are in the hands of 
corporate managers.61 David reduces these shareholders to 
                                                                                                     
 56. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 13, at 978 
(mentioning workers only once in quoted passage describing Germany’s dual 
board system).  
 57. See Charles Schulz, Peanuts, GOCOMICS, http://www.gocomics. 
com/peanuts/1959/11/12/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (depicting Charlie Brown’s 
love for mankind) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 58. See Paul Bloom, Perils of Empathy, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 2, 2016, 9:38 
AM), www.wsj.com/articles/the-perils-of-empathy-1480689513 (last visited Apr. 
18, 2017) (arguing that “when it comes to guiding our decisions, empathy is a 
moral train wreck” and effectively “makes the world worse”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 59. See supra notes 50–52 (deriving David Millon’s take on corporate 
governance from his works). 
 60. See supra notes 53–58 (extracting Lyman Johnson’s thoughts on 
corporate governance from his works). 
 61. See generally, e.g., Millon, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31; Millon, 
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“short-term institutional investors” that pressure managers in 
untoward ways to exploit non-shareholders for their short-term 
purposes.62 Lyman is not as derisive and recognizes that 
investors have been harmed by corporate misconduct, but he also 
seems to view shareholders as somehow less deserving of our 
compassion compared to non-shareholder constituencies.63  
This reduction of shareholders to money-grubbing capitalists 
is natural in moral framing.64 Thus, neither David nor Lyman, in 
commenting on the modern corporate structure, gives attention to 
the individual retirees and savers looking for financial returns for 
their under-funded pensions, their poor-performing individual 
retirement accounts, or their skimpy college savings plans.65 
Thus, the moral forces pitted against each other in the offshoring 
decision would not seem to include—in David’s moral weighting 
and only slightly in Lyman’s—the investors whose savings 
constitute the holdings of institutional intermediaries against 
whom they aim their moral indignation or skepticism. These 
savers, who it would seem David and Lyman seem to disentitle as 
owners, must share the corporate enterprise with other non-
owners. 
                                                                                                     
Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32; Millon, Two Models of CSR, supra note 
33; Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34; Johnson, 
Unsettledness, supra note 35; Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36. 
 62. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 4 (“Shareholder 
pressures for short-term results and compensation packages that reward 
management for delivering them will presumably continue to encourage a 
myopic outlook.”). 
 63. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 982–
86 (describing pro-shareholder activism as favoring shareholders, not other 
corporate constituents, though recognizing that the financial scandals of the 
early 2000s “greatly harmed investors”). 
 64. See Sanjay Sanghoee, Why Shareholder Value Should Not Be the Only 
Goal of Public Companies, TIME, Feb. 4, 2014, http://time.com/4121/why-
shareholder-value-should-not-be-the-only-goal-of-public-companies/ (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2017) (noting that “[i]t is widely accepted that companies should have 
only one goal, which is to maximize returns for investors”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 65. See generally, e.g., Millon, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31; Millon, 
Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32; Millon, Two Models of CSR, supra note 
33; Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34; Johnson, 
Unsettledness, supra note 35; Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36. 
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That is, neither David nor Lyman would seem to be moved by 
the subtext of my offshoring story that shareholders (who do not 
appear explicitly in the story) would be better off if the company 
sought to cut its costs and liability risks by moving its 
manufacturing offshore. Nor would it seem relevant that there 
might be a confluence of interests: Shareholders are happy that 
the offshoring decision will reduce the company’s costs and risks; 
the workers in the United States (and perhaps even more their 
families) are happy not to be exposed to a (possible) carcinogen; 
and the Ruranesia workers (though perhaps less their families) 
are happy for the new employment, whatever the health risks.  
Perhaps Lyman might have been more circumspect, given his 
view that the pluralistic corporation is measured by a process 
where “public interest” directors consider the interests of the 
various stakeholders.66 But who are the stakeholders here, and 
what are their interests? Are they the U.S. workers left jobless, 
but saved from exposure to a possible carcinogen, or are they the 
Ruranesia workers now employed, but at risk of poor health and 
an earlier death? Or, perhaps more broadly, are the stakeholders 
the U.S. communities, now with higher unemployment though 
perhaps fewer health costs, or are they the Ruranesia 
communities, now with higher employment but with higher (or 
lower) health costs?67  
In short, we may not know the strength or direction of the 
“caring” moral vector that both David and Lyman, in different 
                                                                                                     
 66. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 977–
79 (summarizing proposals to install “public interest directors” on corporate 
boards to advance the welfare of non-shareholder stakeholders, such as 
employees, consumers, and communities).  
 67. There is also the possibility that communities are served by certain 
virulent cancers, particularly if they strike workers near their retirement age. 
Perhaps a virulent, fast-acting cancer resulting in lower healthcare costs 
reduces protracted elder-care costs. How should directors weigh such a scenario? 
How would workers in Ruranesia, where life might generally be “poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short,” view the scenario? See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 
(Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1651) (“And the life of man, 
solitary, poore, brutish, and short.”) (describing the consequences of living 
without security, akin to wartime). Ruranesia may also be one of those countries 
with pluterperfect happiness and the value of life should be weighed more 
highly than life in the United States, particularly before America was made 
great again.  
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ways, seem to embrace. Even if we identify that corporate 
governance should ask decision-makers to care about a broader 
set of concerns than financial returns for shareholders, a 
CSR-infused corporate governance does not answer the question: 
For whom should the enlightened corporate managers act? 
David’s references to stories from outside the United States 
would suggest his instincts might side with the Ruranesia 
workers,68 while Lyman’s seeming attention to those who act and 
live “within the corporation,” though not fully recognized by law, 
would suggest his instincts would be for the United States 
workers.69 But we do not know.  
B. Fairness (Equal or Proportional)/Cheating 
David and Lyman differ in their views on the question of the 
appropriate place of non-shareholder constituents in the 
corporation.70 David seems to accept, at least in advancing his 
thesis of “enlightened shareholder value,” that shareholders have 
some sort of “priority” in the corporate hierarchy.71 He does not 
urge, at least in making this argument, a pluralistic model in 
which shareholders and other stakeholders have comparable 
claims on corporate outcomes. Lyman, however, writes in terms 
of a pluralism of interests, in which non-shareholder constituents 
should have claims comparable to those of shareholders.72 Thus, 
for Lyman fairness is about equality, while David seems to accept 
                                                                                                     
 68. See, e.g., Millon, Two Models of CSR, supra note 33, at 531 (discussing 
Norwegian company Yara International’s ASA sponsorship of partnerships to 
“develop storage, transportation, and port facilities that will serve African 
regions”).  
 69. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 974–
75 (tracing the history of corporate responsibility).  
 70. See infra notes 72–84 (discussing David Millon’s and Lyman Johnson’s 
views on non-shareholder constituents). 
 71. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 1 (“ESV still 
recognizes the priority of shareholder interests and therefore differs from a 
pluralist management model based on balancing of all stakeholder interests.”). 
 72. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 410 (arguing that 
institutional pluralism should be encouraged). 
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the possibility that fairness may be proportional to some 
entitlement, including based on capital contributions.73  
In presenting his thesis of enlightened shareholder value, 
David seems to understand fairness in the corporation as arising 
when corporate managers take into account non-shareholder 
interests, but only to the extent they are weighted with respect to 
long-term shareholder interests.74 In this way, David hews more 
closely to traditional doctrine and practice that assumes a 
corporate pecking order.75 Lyman, however, seems to understand 
fairness in the corporation as arising when non-shareholder 
interests are given equal weighting with shareholder interests.76 
Lyman is much more a communitarian, urging the recognition of 
non-shareholder claims that go well beyond traditional doctrine 
and practice.  
In addition, David and Lyman see the motives for 
consideration of non-shareholder interests as emanating from 
different sources. For David, a broader management perspective 
in both a “longitudinal” (temporal) dimension and a “latitudinal” 
(range of interests) dimension may arise from growing 
shareholder and other market pressures to consider interests 
beyond short-term shareholder financial results.77 For Lyman, a 
more ecumenical management perspective may not be supported 
by current judicial doctrine and thus would require a legislative 
                                                                                                     
 73. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 3 (explaining 
that the ESV approach is an alternative to both a shareholder primacy approach 
and a pluralist approach). 
 74. See id. at 7 (“[M]anagement must attend to the full range of 
considerations that determine its well-being.”).  
 75. See id. at 2 (arguing that U.S. corporate law provides “ample space for 
express recognition of nonshareholder interests and long-run approach to 
management”). 
 76. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 445 (embracing the idea 
that pursuit of common-good is achieved when considered at the institutional 
and individual level).  
 77. See Millon, Two Models of CSR, supra note 33, at 536 (identifying a 
“sustainable model of CSR” as recognition that corporation’s long-run prosperity 
depends on the well-being of various stakeholders); see also Millon, Enlightened 
Shareholder, supra note 32, at 3–4 (identifying emerging attitudes of 
institutional shareholders toward socially-responsible investing and pressures 
from public opinion, moved by non-governmental organizations and the media, 
to consider longer-term labor and environmental impacts). 
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solution, one beyond that offered by the fledgling “benefit 
corporation.”78  
Lyman disparages the argument that shareholders have a 
legal entitlement or deserve a priority in the corporate 
hierarchy.79 He heaps scorn on the Law and Economics 
movement, decrying its “steely focus on investor well-being via 
hostile takeovers” and its disaggregation of “the corporate 
institution into a mere ‘nexus’ of various contracting parties in 
which investor interests were paramount.”80 David joins in, 
criticizing the nexus-of-contracts theory for its conceiving of the 
corporation as a “legal fiction” and thus discounting the 
“possibility that management might owe duties to the corporate 
entity rather than simply to shareholders.”81 But David seems 
less willing to abandon the corporation’s capitalist underpinnings 
and to take up a communitarian vision of the corporation. 
Shareholders, in David’s view, are entitled to get something for 
their investment.82  
Lyman, however, rejects the libertarian justification for 
shareholder primacy—that shareholders, unlike other 
constituents, have paid for their vaunted status. Lyman 
celebrates the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in the 
Time-Warner83 case that “emphasized that corporate directors 
were legally responsible for directing the ‘corporation’s’ best 
interests and that such company interests were not necessarily 
the same as those of investors seeking a near-term premium for 
                                                                                                     
 78. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 990 
(calling for revision of corporate statutes to reflect both the discretion and duty 
of directors to consider non-shareholder constituents). Nonetheless, David 
accepts that law might be necessary to bring managers to take a longer-term 
perspective, even as they take into account non-shareholder interests. See 
generally Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32 (discussing the room 
for law in socially-oriented corporate responsibility). 
 79. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 2 (“The law does 
not mandate shareholder primacy.”).  
 80. Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 984.  
 81. Millon, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31, at 1034.  
 82. See id. at 1018 (“[M]anagement’s duty is to maximize the shareholders’ 
return on their investments in the corporation.”). 
 83. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
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their stock.”84 That is, Lyman decidedly sides with the “entity 
conception” of the corporation in which all corporate constituents 
have a claim to fair treatment and against the “aggregate theory” 
of the corporation in which only shareholders deserve this 
treatment.85  
How does my offshoring story play out for our two corporate 
moralists—at least with respect to the fairness vector? David 
would seem to be focused on whether and how the interests of 
non-shareholders (principally workers) would impact the 
long-term financial interests of shareholders.86 That is, David 
would seem to consider and gauge the interests of the workers in 
my story, both domestic and foreign, according to their impact on 
enlightened shareholders. Or, maybe not. David’s thoughts on 
how corporate managers might be pressured to consider 
non-shareholder interests could well simply reflect a real politik 
stance that, because re-jiggering the legal corporate governance 
landscape is unlikely, the next best hope is that managers will 
respond to “enlightened” shareholder and market pressures.87 
That is, David admits that optimal “socially responsible behavior” 
in the corporation may have to be legally coerced.88  
Lyman, on the other hand, would not seem to weigh 
shareholder interests in his moral deliberations.89 Whether the 
company keeps its manufacturing processes in the United States 
or moves them abroad, shareholders would seem to be the least of 
Lyman’s concerns. What is unclear, though, is how Lyman would 
resolve inter-constituency conflicts. His writings pit shareholders 
                                                                                                     
 84. Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 984–85 
(citing Time, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1150, 1154). 
 85. Id. at 985 
 86. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 3 (discussing 
how ESV is a long-term approach and that it “rejects a sole focus on shareholder 
interests and instead embraces a broader approach that includes the 
corporation's other stakeholders as well”). 
 87. See id. at 39 (noting this version of ESV is market-driven). 
 88. See id. at 6 (“[C]ritics of transnational corporations should not expect 
that a commitment to shareholder value—even if enlightened—will necessarily 
generate the measure of socially responsible behavior that they believe to be 
appropriate.”).  
 89. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 422 (“The issue of the 
best interests of the corporation is a matter of concern only for directors.”). 
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against non-shareholder constituencies, but do not recognize that 
when shareholders are removed from the moral calculus, the 
conflicts among non-shareholders can be just as real. Corporate 
moral discourse is a messy affair, and it is understandable that 
those who engage in it have not specified precisely how 
multi-dimensional decision-making works.  
C. Freedom/Coercion 
Lyman and David push back against the motivated 
reasoning of the Law and Economics movement that celebrates 
the freedom afforded corporate management under the business 
judgment rule (BJR).90 But they do so for different reasons.  
David would leave intact the BJR, but have its capacious 
boundaries include decisions that “sacrifice short-term 
shareholder profits for the sake of nonshareholder 
considerations . . . by reference to the corporation’s long-run 
well-being.”91 David seems to recognize the lack of normative 
limits on the discretion exercised by directors, accepting a view 
that “director primacy” may accurately describe the operation of 
corporate decision-making.92 As he points out, “managerial 
discretion, broadly if not entirely shielded from shareholder 
oversight, is arguably the foundation of Delaware corporate 
law.”93 
Lyman, on the other hand, has argued for a rethinking of 
judicial oversight of corporate decisions, urging a shift from the 
current perspective of directorial discretion under the BJR (a 
nearly quintessential “freedom” moral vector) to one that begins 
                                                                                                     
 90. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 8 (noting that 
under the BJR, “the judiciary will not second-guess strategic and operational 
decisions as long as they are based on sufficient information, not subject to 
conflict of interest, and made in good faith”). 
 91. Id. at 8.  
 92. See Millon, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31, at 1017 (“In today’s 
corporate law discourse, the ‘shareholder protection’ version of shareholder 
primacy resonates with Professor Stephen Bainbridge's ‘director primacy’ theory 
of corporate law.”). 
 93. Id. at 1023.  
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with questions of duty (a decidedly “loyalty” moral vector).94 As 
Lyman has said, “fiduciary duties should be made more 
prominent and the BJR should be dramatically deemphasized.”95 
Lyman asserts that the reluctance to find directors have breached 
duties, as preached by the BJR, should be limited to boardroom 
decisions and not extended to decisions or actions by officers and 
controlling shareholders.96 He points out, “the business judgment 
rule is well established as a mainstay doctrine in Delaware only 
with respect to corporate directors, not with respect to officers or 
controlling shareholders.”97  
David recaps the history of the “law and economics” love 
affair with “shareholder primacy.” It is curious, though, that a 
moral tribe (the Chicago School) that so celebrates freedom would 
seek to enslave corporate managers to shareholder masters. Why 
the yoke of “shareholder primacy”? Although David does not 
explicitly answer the question, the answer may well be that the 
rhetoric of shareholder primacy is itself a smoke screen. Knowing 
that neither law nor practice (nor political realities) would make 
corporate managers subservient to shareholders, the Chicago 
School advances a secret agenda of managerial empowerment by 
arguing for the appearances of managerial agency.98 
As told by David, there was no great rising up against 
managerial overreaching, no march on Dover or D.C. to 
unshackle shareholders from their managerialist masters, no 
protest movement when the takeover tools of the 1980s were 
essentially dulled and de-fanged by a variety of legal and extra-
legal forces that left managers as powerful as ever. In David’s 
words, “corporate law has not evolved in ways that empower 
shareholders to exercise direct control over those on whom they 
are dependent for their financial returns.”99 Shareholders are left 
                                                                                                     
 94. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 424–25 (asserting that 
Delaware’s “pride of place” for BJR should be replaced by showcasing fiduciary 
duties).  
 95. Id. at 405. 
 96. Id. at 410.  
 97. Id.  
 98.  See generally Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32. 
 99. Millon, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31, at 1034.  
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with an activism that operates at the fringes of the enormous 
repository of discretion left to corporate managers.  
David also explores whether international norms might 
compel a corporate board to choose a non-shareholder approach to 
protect human rights. While he concludes that hard international 
law (treaties and customary norms) do not specify human rights 
and environmental obligations applicable to transnational 
corporations, he does find an emerging soft law governing 
activities of transnational companies.100 He points to the United 
Nations Global Compact, which specifies ten principles of 
“corporate citizenship in the world economy” in the areas of 
human rights, labor, the environment, and anticorruption.101 
Although participation is voluntary, some 5,200 companies in 130 
countries have signed on and are obligated to prepare and 
provide annual reports.102 
That is, David sees soft norms as beginning to create coercive 
pressures on corporate managers to consider basic human rights 
in their decision-making—particularly in transnational 
companies that aspire to “corporate global citizenship.”103 That is, 
the tribal boundaries for transnational corporate managers are 
being re-defined through the tribe’s own processes of 
metamorphosis. It is a hopeful story that recognizes the limited 
range of law and the much wider (and more powerful) range in 
which moral values operate.  
In addition, David imagines a “strategic” CSR in which the 
claims for various stakeholders work in tandem with the profit 
motives of shareholders, thus countering the “law and economics” 
view of CSR as imposing losses on shareholders in a zero-sum 
game.104  
                                                                                                     
 100. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 84–85 (pointing 
to United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which specifically 
calls on private groups, thus corporations, to protect basic human rights).  
 101. Id. at 13. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See id. at 13–14 (noting how such norms may be incorporated in 
companies’ voluntary codes of conduct).  
 104. See Millon, Two Models of CSR, supra note 33, at 533–35 (describing 
“strategic” versus “philanthropic” CSR).  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AS MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 1145 
Lyman, unlike David, is more concerned with hard norms 
and the rhetorical power of the BJR to soften judicial resolve to 
oversee the exercise of managerial discretion on behalf of the 
“corporation.” For example, in discussing the waivability of 
fiduciary duties, Lyman is unbending and inveterate in defending 
the force of duties in business organizations.105 In fact, it is 
remarkable how Justice Cardozo’s words resonate and continue 
their life in Lyman’s views on corporate duties: 
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the 
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor 
the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this 
there has developed a tradition that is unbending and 
inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of 
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of 
undivided loyalty . . . .106 
In discussing the ability of participants in a business to 
waive the sanctity of their relationship in the name of contractual 
freedom, Lyman articulates the arguments for waivers. Arguably, 
he points out, they would create “greater certainty and 
determinacy in intra-firm relations” and allow investors to bear 
the “greater risk from broad waivers for other perceived 
benefits”—safeguarded against “egregious misconduct” by 
managers’ desire to protect their reputations and their need to 
access capital markets.107 But these are the arguments of those 
who celebrate the freedom granted directors under the BJR, and 
Lyman is skeptical. There are “well-recognized shortcomings with 
much ex ante bargaining” and courts “should continue to worry 
about the abuse of managerial discretion.”108 Moreover, waivers 
(freedom) may not be for investors alone to give: The business 
entity (the corporation) is pluralistic.109 
                                                                                                     
 105. See Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36, at 721 (stating that 
waiver statutes are necessary to waive contractual duties, but not sufficient to 
establish appropriateness of the waiver). 
 106. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928).  
 107. Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36, at 721.  
 108. Id. at 722.  
 109. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 438 (“[L]aw rightly 
adopts an enabling and pluralistic approach to corporate purpose . . . .”). 
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Lyman elevates corporate duties to a central role in corporate 
law and corporate governance, with the focus of corporate law not 
on managerial “freedom” but on managerial “duties.”110 Lyman 
proposes a fundamental rethinking of the BJR and its analytical 
preeminence, arguing for making fiduciary duties “more 
prominent” and the BJR “dramatically deemphasized.”111  
So how would my story resonate to David and Lyman—under 
the influence of the “freedom” vector? David would make clear 
that the board has the freedom to choose “employment policies 
that seem costly in the short term” if they could be justified over 
a longer term.112 That is, the board would not be bound to choose 
to move the company’s manufacturing offshore. David intimates 
that the directors, moved by new soft norms, might decide to have 
the company stay in the United States and perhaps undertake 
costly worker-protection measures or to move only after an 
alternative manufacturing process were identified. Perhaps, 
David would suggest, the board would be moved to enhance 
goodwill among consumers or perhaps feel compelled to respond 
to pressure from sustainable, responsible, impact (SRI) 
shareholders. In the end, while David goes to lengths to assert 
the board is not compelled to pursue short-term shareholder 
interests, he does not give a full account of the soft norms that 
might compel the moral decisions faced by directors.  
Lyman paints a darker portrait of the management soul. He 
disdains the judicial attitude that corporate managers have an 
inherent freedom to choose the corporation’s trajectory.113 
                                                                                                     
 110. See id. at 405 (“[I]t is suggested that fiduciary duties should be made 
more prominent and the business judgment rule should be dramatically 
deemphasized.”). 
 111. Id.; see also Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, 
at 977 n.12 (arguing that corporate managers do not only owe a duty to their 
stockholders to make a profit but should advance a range of broader “corporate” 
interests (citing E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932))).  
 112.  David Millon, Human Rights and Delaware Corporate Law, 25 PAC. 
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 173, 179 (2012). 
 113. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 405 (“For directors, those 
[policy] rationales do not apply in the loyalty setting, and in the care setting, 
can be achieved by recalling simply that there is no substance to judicial review 
in that context.”). 
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Instead, he argues for a fundamental rethinking of the BJR and 
its soporific incantations that dissolve the sense of duty that he 
sees as central to the pluralism that defines the corporation and 
its purpose.114 Thus, Lyman would address the offshoring 
question by reference to the corporate purpose, a purpose to 
which the corporate directors are duty-bound to advance. In the 
end, the offshoring story lacks important details, and Lyman’s 
approach might well be one of process. The corporate directors 
would be compelled to dig more deeply into the questions of 
effects on the American (and the Ruranesia) workers, their 
families and communities. Lyman points out that “American 
society” has become “somewhat disenchanted with the corporate 
sector,” and “societal expectations of the private sector are 
shifting.”115 Perhaps, the corporate board would also be compelled 
to consider the effects of the offshoring decision on the business’s 
overall carbon footprint. After all, Lyman is decidedly non-
libertarian.  
D. Loyalty/Betrayal 
David and Lyman have a nuanced difference in their views 
on the question to whom corporate managers owe their 
allegiance. David accepts, at least for the sake of argument, that 
shareholders have “priority” and thus does not urge a pluralistic 
model in which shareholders and other stakeholders have 
comparable claims on corporate outcomes. Lyman, however, 
advocates for a pluralism of interests, in which corporate 
directors owe their loyalty to the “corporation” and must put 
aside their own personal views for the collective good.  
Thus, David seeks to broaden the dimensions that corporate 
managers should consider, but within the framework of long-term 
shareholder interests. He asserts that corporate managers are 
not required by state corporate law (particularly the law of 
Delaware) to accept shareholder primacy. Instead, corporate 
                                                                                                     
 114. See id. at 438 (asserting that “the deference of the business judgment 
rule becomes a key mechanism for creating the necessary slack between law’s 
agnosticism about corporate purpose and actual governance conduct”). 
 115. Id.  
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managers should see themselves as bound to consider impacts on 
the “corporation.”116 Likewise, but even more, Lyman questions 
whether directors should hold shareholders in sacred worship, 
decrying that “boards of public companies . . . seem far more 
receptive to shareholder concerns than was true for much of the 
twentieth century.”117 For Lyman, the implication is that this 
fawning over shareholders is somehow disloyal, that directors 
should have other objects of their loyalty (putting other interests 
ahead of their own).  
David sees misplaced loyalty in the corporation, with stock-
based compensation and a corporate culture of “shareholder 
loyalty,” inexorably pushing managers to focus on short-term 
shareholder value.118 He decries the “radical shareholder 
primacy” thesis that enforces, legally and in practice, a view that 
managers owe undivided loyalty to shareholders and the 
maximization of their financial wealth.119 Further, David points 
out that pressures from institutional shareholders (now 
collectivized by Institutional Shareholder Services) have led 
corporate boards to dismantle poison pills and staggered boards, 
giving shareholders and their demands for short-term results 
even more salience in the boardroom.120 
Lyman carries forward his views on the centrality of “duty” 
in the corporation (particularly selfless loyalty to the corporation) 
in his views of waiver of fiduciary duties. Although writing 
mostly about waivers in non-corporate settings, Lyman is quick 
                                                                                                     
 116. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 72 (stating that 
fiduciary duties run to corporation and identifying relevant consideration to 
include impact on non-shareholder constituencies including “creditors, 
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally”). 
 117. Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 986.  
 118. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 77–79 
(concluding that equity-based pay rewards short-term results rather than 
longer-term performance and management culture assume that primary loyalty 
should be to shareholders).  
 119. See Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31, at 1018–19 
(“[M]anagement’s job is to act on behalf of shareholders, using its managerial 
authority to advance their interests . . . . [And the] primary role of corporate law 
is to enhance management’s accountability to the shareholders.”).  
 120. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 78 (describing 
events as of 2010, before the congressional mandate of say-on-pay, which 
predictably would further exacerbate shareholder pressures).  
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to state he finds such waivers “objectionable.”121 He further 
argues that the Delaware constitution prohibits corporate 
statutes that would permit Delaware judges to uphold private 
waiver of fiduciary duties.122 The basis for this constitutional 
objection is key to understanding the vaunted place that duty 
holds for Lyman in corporate law. As he explains, the business 
bar and judiciary “forget that equity originates outside law and 
does not readily yield to law’s strictures.”123 That is, duty is 
inherent in the business (especially, the corporate) form whose 
legal being rests on the foundation of equity jurisdiction. 
If fiduciary duty and equity are inseparable, as they are for 
Lyman, the question becomes toward what end. According to 
Aristotle, equity “must correct the possible injustice resulting 
from the categorical.”124 The injustices that Lyman imagines are 
steeped in moral discourse: the disloyalty of directors who 
advance a shareholders’ meeting date to frustrate a voting 
insurgency; the directors who, after accepting a position of trust, 
are grossly negligent in failing to supervise corporate affairs.125 
Ultimately the validity of contractual waivers depends on a 
judicial (equitable) assessment of “the degree of moral and 
commercial repugnance of the [challenged] managerial behavior” 
where “the overall state of business morality [is] an important 
and legitimate social concern.”126  
So how does the moral value of loyalty play out in the 
resolution of the offshoring decision in my story? For David, there 
is less of a sense of the importance of the loyalty that managers 
owe to long-term corporate interests. This is not surprising. The 
                                                                                                     
 121. Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36, at 702 (“[T]he author 
believes that permitting wholesale waiver of fiduciary duties is objectionable 
and bad policy.”). 
 122. See id. (“[T]here is substantial doubt as to whether fiduciary duties in 
unincorporated business associations formed under Delaware law can, by 
private agreement, be waived at all.”).  
 123. Id. at 708.  
 124. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 141 (Martin Ostwald trans., 
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1962).  
 125. Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36, at 710–13 (citing Schnell 
v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971) and Charitable Corp. v. 
Sutton, 2 Atk. 400, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch. 1742)).  
 126. Id. at 719–20. 
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soul of a progressive is less concerned about loyalty (with its 
overtones of order and sanctity) than about compassion and 
fairness. David does not seem to experience the visceral betrayal 
when managers look out for their own short-term interests, 
compared to feelings that Lyman has when managers are disloyal 
to the corporate purpose. Lyman, true to his conservative matrix, 
calls on a return to deep-seated (traditional) notions from equity 
that call on directors to be selfless. How this selflessness should 
be expressed in an offshoring decision is, again, hard to say. For 
David, it might well be that the subtexts of human rights in the 
workplace and environmental harm (such as runoffs from the 
toxic chemicals used in the manufacturing process) guide his 
judgment. For Lyman, loyalty to the corporation might well be 
perceived as loyalty to the existing order—that is, the American 
workers and society for which the corporation operates.  
E. Order and Obedience/Chaos 
David and Lyman have markedly different views of the way 
in which corporate order exists and might evolve. For David, 
management culture plays an important (if not critical) role in 
molding the moral decisions of corporate decision makers—
perhaps even more important than law.127 While recognizing a 
place for law, David seems to see corporate evolution as 
happening from internal, extra-legal forces.128 For Lyman, on the 
other hand, the framing construct for his propounded moral 
matrices is corporate law. Lyman shows an abiding faith in the 
“rule of law” (or perhaps “rule of equity”) and its analytical 
purity: If we can just make persuasive arguments, the law will 
                                                                                                     
 127. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 78–80 
(speculating how sustainability values being adopted by transnational 
companies might infuse US corporate culture).  
 128. See id. at 79–80 (pointing to Section 172 of the U.K. Companies Act of 
2006, which requires directors to promote interests of the corporation for the 
benefit of shareholders, but with regard for long-term consequences, employee 
interests, relations with suppliers and customers, and impacts on the 
community and environment).  
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follow.129 For Lyman, better logic equals—or, at least, eventually 
will equal—better law and better outcomes.  
David perceives that a move from the shareholder-centric 
corporation to one that pays “heightened attention to human 
rights and environmental considerations” will happen because of 
the potential costs to the corporation of disregarding these 
non-shareholder factors.130 That is, just as the corporation seeks 
to gauge and control the financial, litigation, and reputational 
risks to shareholder value, David imagines that similar cost-
benefit exigencies will lead to a more pluralistic corporation.131 
This, perhaps in a leap of hope for David, will be because 
enlightened shareholders demand such a result.  
In fact, David sees an emerging “new corporate order” that 
arises from a redefined relationship between institutional 
shareholders and corporate management in which such 
shareholders bind together to “incorporate [environmental, social, 
and governance] ESG issues into investment analysis and 
decision-making processes . . . [and to] be active owners and 
incorporate ESG issues into ownership policies and practices.”132 
Since Millon predicted this new order, there has been (as 
described before) a perceptible change in the avowed ESG focus of 
many U.S. public companies.133 Whether this is indeed a move 
toward a new and accountable order is still unclear. After all, 
                                                                                                     
 129. For example, Lyman observes as an article of faith: “Ultimately, judges 
must express the resolution of fundamental issues in doctrinal terms, their 
lingua franca.” Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 408. He cites to 
viewpoints of various legal scholars, but does not explain why judges must 
explain how their decisions arise from doctrine. Id. Perhaps resorting to doctrine 
is an accepted modality of the legal culture that judges inhabit. They are bound 
by accepted norms, including a common language. A decision by a highest court 
that simply stated, “We affirm [or] reverse [or] remand, because we just feel that 
way,” would face academic finger-wagging and snickering. But others might 
view such a pithy judicial opinion as a breath of honesty.  
 130. Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 80. 
 131. See id. at 81–84 (discussing the importance of corporate sensitivity to 
liability and reputational risk).  
 132. See id. at 84–85 (describing United Nations Principles for Responsible 
Investment, a set of six core principles agreed to by twenty institutional 
shareholders from twelve countries through the coordination of the U.N. 
Secretary-General).  
 133. Id.   
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predictions of a new “CSR corporation” have been afoot for nearly 
two decades.134 And real corporate engagement has been spotty. 
For example, an SEC guidance in 2010 urging greater corporate 
disclosure of the various regulatory, market, and operational 
risks of climate change fell mostly on deaf ears.135 But, if a new 
CSR is beginning to coalesce, it could transform corporate 
culture.  
Lyman, on the other hand, sees a new corporate order arising 
from law. Just as Louis Brandeis grieved the dissolution of 
regulatory order in the late Nineteenth Century136—in a spiraling 
race of laxity that erased the limits on amount of capital, 
specifications of duration of the corporation, prohibitions on 
holding of stock in other corporations, and shareholder veto 
powers,137 Lyman imagines a return to “the good old days.” He 
sees some of this coming from managerial “professional 
introspection” and engagement within the larger corporate 
community, but especially from the heretofore-BJR-enamored 
“Delaware bench” who he urges to “rethink and possibly remold 
prior rulings, in the light of experience.”138  
In this vein, Lyman also imagines not only a diminishment of 
the BJR, but also a new order of duties within the corporation. 
                                                                                                     
 134. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 85 (citing Claire 
Moore Dickerson, Human Rights: The Emerging Norm of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1431, 1439–40 (2002)).  
 135. See Alan R. Palmiter, Climate Change Disclosure: A Failed SEC 
Mandate, SSRN (Aug. 3, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2639181 (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2017) (“In 2010 the SEC issued an interpretive guidance calling on 
public companies to take seriously their disclosure responsibilities with respect 
to climate risk . . . Then it all unraveled.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 136. See TONY FREYER, REGULATING BIG BUSINESS: ANTITRUST IN GREAT 
BRITAIN AND AMERICA 1880–1990 191–95 (describing Brandeis’ dissents in post-
war deregulation cases); see also, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 
421, 429 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (discussing concerns about the Court 
departing from established practice in dismissing regulation cases). 
 137. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 975 
(“[C]orporate law itself developed in such a way as to loosen, not tighten, most 
constraints on those who govern public corporations.”). 
 138. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 408–09 (admonishing 
“judges, as a lawmaking mechanism, to stand between the categorical edicts of a 
legislative/regulatory state and pure, unconstrained, private ordering”).  
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Specifically, he seeks to revive the idea of “public directors” 
who—in addition to being selected by non-shareholder 
constituencies—would owe duties to the corporation.139 Thus, 
these directors (even though having the ostensible purpose to 
represent non-shareholder interests and viewpoints) would be 
duty-bound to consider the “corporation” as a totality.  
Lyman, in this sense, is anti-order. He would do away with 
the monism of shareholder profit maximization. He states his 
worry that “Delaware law might be interpreted as imposing an 
undesirable monism of corporate purpose at a time when, in 
corporate law as elsewhere, institutional pluralism should be 
encouraged.”140 Monism is well-structured; its elegance 
commands respect; it is conservative. If a board chooses to erect 
an antitakeover barrier that dilutes shareholder value and 
primacy—as happened in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. 
Newmark,141 where the directors sought to preserve the control 
structure thus to preserve the company’s purpose to create a 
“community” of those using the firm’s services—monism offers a 
clear answer.142 In the case, directors sought to undo the monistic 
purpose of the corporation.  
Consistent with his view that law should (or does) recognize 
a pluralistic corporate purpose, Lyman asserts that the legal 
corporate order resolves the question whether corporate rights 
and duties are waivable. The notion of waiver of corporate duties, 
first unleashed by the “law and economics” movement that re-
imagined the corporation as contract, is at odds with Lyman’s 
view of the law-bound order of the corporation.143 Not only finding 
such waivers to be “bad sportsmanship,” Lyman lays out a 
well-researched argument that whatever waiver authorizations 
                                                                                                     
 139. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 977–
78 (describing proposals for revamped composition of boards of directors). 
 140. Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 409–10.  
 141. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).  
 142. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 439 (explaining that 
Craigslist “operates its business as a community service”).  
 143. See Larry E. Ribstein, Writing About and Teaching Corporate Law: 
Reflections on Corporate Law and Economic Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 509, 523 
(1991) (discussing essays on the proposition of the corporation as a contract and 
that the corporation “is a set of contractual relationships”).  
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the state’s legislature might have enacted are unenforceable in 
Delaware courts as a matter of Delaware constitutional law.144 
Although he makes this point primarily in the context of 
non-corporate forms, where Delaware judges and courts have 
exhibited a broad willingness to accept contractual waivers of 
fiduciary duties,145 the essential point that Lyman makes is that 
corporate fiduciary duties cannot be “curtailed or negated.”146  
So how would the moral orders imagined by David and 
Lyman help resolve the story of the offshoring corporation? David 
would begin by denying the answer propounded by “radical 
shareholder primacy”—that the offshoring decision should be 
based on a short-term, cost-benefit analysis focused on 
shareholder profits.147 But David is left floundering about how to 
measure longer-term effects and on whom. As argued by some, a 
corporation whose purpose is to advance the interests of multiple 
constituents is a corporation whose order comes to turn on the 
caprice of managers.148 But perhaps this is the new corporate 
order, and it will have to sort out what a pluralistic corporation 
means.149 Lyman, even more than David, instinctively sees the 
                                                                                                     
 144. See Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36, at 701–05 
(analogizing corporate rules to the rules of golf, which the players are not 
permitted to waive).  
 145. See id. at 720 (comparing corporate and non-corporate law in 
Delaware).  
 146. See id. at 705 (explaining that Delaware’s exculpation statute only 
permits reduction or elimination of monetary damages for breaches of the duty 
of care, but not alteration of the duty itself).  
 147. See Millon, Shareholder Primacy, supra note 31, at 1013–14 (describing 
“radical shareholder primacy” as the version of shareholder primacy theory 
whose key corporate law focus is to “minimize agency costs so as to maximize 
shareholder wealth”).  
 148. See Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various 
Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate 
Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 24, 31–36 (1991) (criticizing 
non-shareholder constituency statutes for requiring “corporate agents to serve 
so many masters—employees, communities, bondholders, customers, 
suppliers—that the costs of dual fiduciary duties in terms of confusion and 
misunderstanding by courts and litigants vastly outweigh any 
potential benefits”). 
 149. See id. at 42–43 (referencing a pluralist understanding of governmental 
process such that local communities mobilize to politically oppose corporate 
harms, but without describing a pluralistic corporation).  
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corporation as pluralistic.150 But why this is so is unclear. Lyman 
would see the directors as compelled to consider the interests of 
workers, presumably at home and abroad.151 And their 
communities would also have some weight on the scales. Perhaps 
by bringing new directors to the board, the corporate culture 
would shift as it sought to incorporate a wider set of moral 
matrices beyond the order imposed by shareholder wealth 
maximization.152  
F. Sacred/Sacrilege 
David and Lyman have different views on the ultimate 
purpose of the corporation—that is, what corporate governance 
would hold as sacred. David’s view seems much more 
instrumental, perhaps borrowing from the instrumental (and 
thus amoral) constructs prevalent in the corporate governance 
literature.153 Lyman, on the other hand, sees the corporation as 
infused by its nature with a public, social, and thus sacred 
purpose.154 
David, while urging a more other-thinking corporation, 
places such a corporation in a corporate culture in which he 
recognizes that financial self-interest drives all action.155 David’s 
                                                                                                     
 150. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 438 (favoring the law’s 
“enabling and pluralistic approach to corporate purpose” because of the need to 
hold directors and managers “accountable for their conduct”).  
 151. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 978 
(noting that a reform effort focused on worker representation on the board has 
failed to take root in the United States). 
 152. See Johnson, Non-Waivable Duties, supra note 36, at 719–20 
(reminding scholars that the “overall state of business morality” is an 
“important and legitimate societal concern”).  
 153.  See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 96–97 
(concluding that bottom line financial concerns do and will continue to drive 
corporate management and corporate social responsibility).  
 154. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 451 (concluding that the 
money-maximizing purpose neglects “broader social expectations of business 
conduct in the modern world”). 
 155. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (accepting the general 
primacy of profit maximization efforts in corporate management in the current 
and prospective corporate legal landscape). 
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vision of a corporation guided by enlightened shareholders is 
ultimately “driven” by financial self-interest, which because of 
market and reputational pressures acts as a force to expand 
attention to human rights, environmental, and other CSR 
values.156 For David, at least in his description of the means and 
the end of the corporation, money remains the corporation’s 
sacred purpose.157 
Lyman, however, seems to be animated by a vision of the 
modern corporation espoused by Adolf Berle.158 Pointing to the 
analysis of Professors Bratton and Wachter, Lyman identifies 
that Berle did not advocate shareholder empowerment as an end, 
but rather as a means.159 “His belief [was] that a public 
corporation should broadly serve societal goals, since powerful 
institutional investors simply represent one set of oligarchs 
replacing another—corporate managers.”160 For Lyman, the 
proper end is a re-purposed corporation, not one that merely 
chooses to pursue its wealth-maximizing purpose in a more 
inclusive, full-hearted way.161  
Lyman decries that the modern corporation’s purposes have 
been usurped and defiled:  
Today, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, 
unfolding developments in the law of corporate governance—
state and federal—still take no direct heed of broad corporate 
responsibility concerns in regular business corporations 
                                                                                                     
 156. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 39–40 
(discussing the reputational harm that would result from inattention to these 
considerations). 
 157. See id. at 46 (noting the reputational cost concerns that play a role in 
the ultimate cost-benefit considerations of corporate management).  
 158. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 974 
(citing ADOLF BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 68 (1932) (referencing the grip Berle’s contributions have had 
on corporate law)). 
 159. See id. at 987 (noting that “shareholder empowerment was not one of 
the political outcomes envisioned” by Berle).  
 160. Id. at 987.  
 161. See id. at 989 (finding that the “historical corporate responsibility 
approach of focusing solely on director-manager volunteerism or external legal 
regulation of the corporation needs rethinking”).  
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because corporate governance remains a closed system of just 
three groups—investors, directors, and managers.162  
Lyman, instead, admires the earlier voices that imagined 
corporate structures that included a broader set of concerns.163  
Further, Lyman decries that Delaware has strayed from a 
pluralistic vision of the corporation, which he sees as its 
animating purpose.164 As to corporate purpose, Lyman calls on 
“Delaware law [to] permit a pluralistic approach in the for-profit 
corporate sector” and away from “a strict shareholder primacy 
focus in the 2010 eBay decision.”165 Thus, Lyman seeks a new 
corporate order—statutory, to be sure—that empowers the 
modern corporation to pursue purposes other than shareholder-
centric monistic purposes.166  
How would David’s and Lyman’s views on the animating 
purpose of the corporation—its sacred nature—guide them in 
resolving my offshoring story? David would seem to believe the 
corporation’s decision should be decided by financial self-interest, 
informed by “social responsibility” factors that seep into the 
financial cost-benefit calculus by virtue of non-corporate legal 
risks, consumer pressures, and public shaming.167 That is, 
corporate decision makers might do good, but only to the extent 
they feel compelled to do well. Capitalism’s worship of profits, 
which David seems to adopt for the sake of argument, may 
occupy a sacred place in the corporation.168 
Lyman, however, sees a corporation—and thus its 
decision-making culture—as more defined by legal constraints 
                                                                                                     
 162. Id. at 988. 
 163. See id. at 977 (describing a 1959 essay by Abram Chayes calling on 
non-investor groups as having a greater say in corporate decisions as “truly 
innovative, fairly vague”).  
 164. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 405 (introducing his 
argument that Delaware law should permit a pluralistic approach in the for-
profit corporate sector).  
 165. Id. at 405.  
 166. See id. at 409, 448–49 (proposing various legislative solutions).  
 167. See Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 93 (discussing 
the extra-legal pressures imposed upon corporations by private actors that 
“reshape management attitudes and behavior”). 
 168. See id. at 95 (reiterating the fact that “[a]ll businesses must earn 
profits in order to survive and prosper”).  
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and compulsion.169 He sees the corporation as being wayward. 
The typical publicly-traded corporation no longer holds sacred 
values of selfless commitment to the well-being of others.170 
Instead, Lyman concludes that a commitment to others is today 
expressed in extra-corporate norms, such as environmental law 
or workplace safety regulation.171 Within the corporation he does 
not perceive selflessness or even mechanisms that might lead to 
this. In short, Lyman might well react to the offshoring story by 
decrying the absence of legal rules against offshoring jobs in the 
United States or the failure of legal norms to protect Ruranesia 
workers.  
IV. Conclusion 
The pluralistic corporation—like sustainability—is 
multi-faceted.172 Move one part and another moves, often in 
unexpected ways. In the end, the law of corporate governance 
gives corporate decision makers capacious room to balance 
(consciously and unconsciously) the moving parts of nearly every 
business decision.173 The interesting questions of corporate 
governance are how business decisions happen, and perhaps even 
more interesting how decision-making might be made to evolve.  
Attempts at legal reform would seem bound to fail. For 
example, Lyman points out that “other constituency” statutes—
which call on corporate directors to take into account the 
interests of constituencies beyond those of short-term 
                                                                                                     
 169. See supra note 144, at 702 (disputing the ability to contractually waive 
fiduciary duties under Delaware law).  
 170. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 975 
(noting the corporation’s “rise in commercial significance” and the now 
“unsustainable neglect of corporate responsibility”).  
 171. See id. at 976 (determining that corporate law regulation’s decline has 
led to external regulations designed to protect “vulnerable constituencies such 
as consumers, employees, and the natural environment”).  
 172. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 436 (describing the 
pluralistic approach whereby purposes are pursued by “combining financial 
pursuits with ‘socially responsible’ objectives”). 
 173. See Millon, Two Models of CSR, supra note 33, at 524 (remarking on 
the “main challenge” to balance “potentially conflicting interests implicated by 
business decisions”).   
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shareholders—have been a resounding failure.174 In Lyman’s 
words, “these laws [adopted in nearly thirty jurisdictions] appear 
to have had little visible and enduring impact on corporate 
governance.”175  
Instead, like our political constitutional structure, the most 
powerful force moving the body politic of the modern corporation 
is “soft law,” that body of norms that are nearly unperceived, but 
that guide attitudes, behavior and decisions as surely as 
gravity.176 The legal “bite” of positive law—what most corporate 
law academics seem to mean when referring to corporate 
governance—may be far less affective than the “evolving 
normative expectations as to what responsible corporate conduct 
should look like in the twenty-first century.”177 That is, corporate 
governance is really a set of moral matrices embedded in the 
process of corporate decision-making.178 
So if corporate governance reform is to embrace a larger 
social consciousness, it will not happen with the flourish of a 
legislative pen or the incantations made in a judicial opinion 
(even by a court of equity), but rather from a shift in moral 
perspective. This is a great lesson of moral psychology.179 We are 
                                                                                                     
 174. For the description of statutes as expressly authorizing board of 
directors to consider non-shareholder interests, including employees, customers, 
suppliers, creditors, and local communities see Johnson, Law and Corporate 
Responsibility, supra note 34, at 979 (listing these statutes); Millon, Enlightened 
Shareholder, supra note 32, at 73–74 (same). 
 175. Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 980; see 
also Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 9 (counting forty-one 
jurisdictions with a constituency or stakeholder statute). See generally Millon, 
Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 30; Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical 
and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. 
L. REV. 579 (1992).  
 176. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 981 
(describing “soft law” as non-binding initiatives lacking the legal ‘bite’ of positive 
law); see also Millon, Enlightened Shareholder, supra note 32, at 75 (finding 
that “‘soft law’ developments illustrate movement towards a “set of substantive 
standards governing the activities of transnational companies”).   
 177. Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 981.   
 178. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 35, at 429 (referencing “moral 
discourse” and the possibility of “ex ante moral admonition” leading to more 
honest managerial conduct).  
 179. See id. at 429 (noting the contributions of behavioral psychology to 
these moral concepts).  
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not persuaded to change our moral decision making by others’ 
arguments (or motivated reasoning). Instead, moral evolution 
happens when we sense that our “tribal culture” is moving 
toward a new paradigm.180 And we are bound to move with it.  
The term “thought leaders” captures this idea.181 That is, 
thought leaders are those persons embedded within our tribal 
culture who are capable of seeing beyond the boundaries that 
define and protect us.182 They can be the ones (perhaps the only 
ones) to provide new feedback loops. We don’t perceive the 
change; just as individual fish move in a school that itself moves 
like a single organism responding to currents, food sources, and 
threats, we move with the flow of our culture. In Haidt’s words, 
we first bind ourselves to a moral matrix and then become blind 
to others’ moral matrices.183 
It is no surprise, according to Lyman, that “genuine reform of 
the deep decision-making architecture of corporate governance” 
has received “little innovative thinking”—or that it has gone 
“nowhere.”184 Observers of corporate governance have been 
chasing up the wrong tree. Understanding the nature of corporate 
decision-making—and thus ways it might evolve or be reformed—
depends not on formulating well-constructed arguments for 
corporate decision-makers to use as a new roadmap to more 
inclusiveness or even to impose new legal norms that seek to 
                                                                                                     
 180. See generally JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND 
THE GAP BETWEEN US AND THEM (2014) (discussing evolution, culture, and 
personal experience as a launching pad for progressive, forward-thinking).  
 181. See Britton Manasco, If You’re Not a Thought Leader You Won’t 
Survive, 10-3 COMPENSATION & BENEFITS FOR L. OFF. 7 (2010) (identifying 
thought leaders as those with great potential for becoming “trusted 
authorities”).  
 182. See id. (describing three factors that make thought leadership 
important to lawyers and professional business firms in particular).  
 183. See generally HAIDT, supra note 2; Jonathan Haidt & Jesse 
Graham, When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions 
that Liberals May Not Recognize, 20 SOC. JUST. RES. 98 (2007) (“Morality binds 
and blinds. It binds us into ideological teams that fight each other as though the 
fate of the world depended on our side winning each battle. It blinds us to the 
fact that each team is composed of good people who have something important 
to say.”). 
 184. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 976 
(discussing the innovation vacuum in this area). 
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discombobulate existing modalities. It depends on reshaping the 
moral matrix in the boardroom—a major paradigm shift.  
A shift in paradigm is no small matter. As Lyman points out, 
even though “many managers” may disagree with the narrow 
focus on investor well-being, they find it “futile (and against 
self-interest) to resist a share-maximizing strategy pushed by a 
determined group of activists.”185 But times are changing. For 
example, the hedge-fund-led shareholder activism that has 
dominated the academic and policy discourse for the last couple 
decades is beginning to wane.186 Hedge funds are out of favor, as 
their collective promise to beat the market has proved hollow.187 
And there is a rise in socially-responsible investing—a broad and 
amorphous concept—that seems to be placing remarkable new 
pressures on corporate managers to show an “environmental, 
social, governance” (ESG) consciousness.188  
                                                                                                     
 185. Id. at 986.  
 186. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES 
ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, 163–81 (5th ed. 2016) (discussing the 
rise of institutional investor power in the publicly-held business sector and, in 
particular, the proliferation and empowerment of hedge funds).  
 187. See Jen Wieczner, Why Big Investors Are Finally Pulling Their Money 
Out of Hedge Funds, FORTUNE, (Mar. 2 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/ 
03/02/hedge-fund-investors-withdraw-returns/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) 
(noting the generally lackluster returns for hedge fund investors) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also JEFF C. HOOKE & JOHN WALTERS, 
THE MD. PUB. POLICY INST., MARYLAND POLICY REPORT: WALL STREET FEES AND 
INVESTMENT RETURNS FOR 33 STATE PENSION FUNDS 1–2 (2015) 
https://www.mdpolicy.org/docLib/20150804_MarylandPolicyReport201505.pdf 
(finding that state pension-fund investments in private equity funds and hedge 
funds under performed relevant benchmark returns). 
 188. Two recent reports by the Forum for Sustainable and Responsible 
Investing found that “sustainable, responsible, impact” (SRI) investing grew by 
76% from 2012 to 2014 and another 33% from 2014 to 2016, with a fourfold 
increase in assets under management that takes into account environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) issues. FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE & RESPONSIBLE 
INV., REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS 
(11th ed. 2016), http://www.ussif.org/files/SIF_Trends_16_Executive_Summary 
(1).pdf [hereinafter 2016 REPORT]; FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE & RESPONSIBLE INV., 
REPORT ON US SUSTAINABLE, RESPONSIBLE AND IMPACT INVESTING TRENDS (10th 
ed. 2014) http://www.ussif.org/Files/Publications/SIF_Trends_14.F.ES.pdf 
[hereinafter 2014 REPORT]. From 1995 to 2014, SRI assets in the United States 
grew tenfold from $0.6 trillion to $6.2 trillion, 2014 REPORT, and then to $8.7 
trillion in 2016, representing today about 20% of all U.S. financial assets under 
professional management, 2016 REPORT. 
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Thus, Lyman’s concern that “calls for broadly responsible 
conduct” would resonate more with private companies rather 
than companies with publicly traded securities may have 
reversed its polarity in the last few years.189 The pressures on 
managers of public companies to show ESG performance may 
now be greater than the pressures on managers of private 
companies to follow their conscience.190 In fact, companies owned 
by private equity firms would seem to have even more pressures 
to maximize share returns. 
We in the legal academy—and the corporate legal academy—
have become less relevant to those who make corporate law. And 
corporate law has become less relevant to those who make 
corporate decisions. Consider, as does Lyman, the story of Rule 
14a-8.191 It was originally promulgated by the SEC to specify a 
mechanism for shareholders in public companies to vote on 
proposals by fellow shareholders on matters of mutual interest.192 
An early case confirmed the rule’s purpose to give shareholders a 
voice in matters of shareholder-centric corporate governance—in 
the case, to require a shareholder vote on the company’s auditing 
firm and procedures to amend the company’s bylaws.193 But then, 
in the 1970s, the rule came to be used as a tool to put matters of 
corporate social responsibility before shareholders and 
management.194 But none of these CSR proposals garnered 
                                                                                                     
 189. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 989 
(arguing that this is so because private companies are not “subject to capital 
market or shareholder voting pressures”).  
 190. See id. at 989 (“Perhaps, too, the corporate responsibility focus in the 
public corporation will migrate (or broaden) to include calls for more fully 
exploring—culturally and legally—the ‘social responsibility’ aspects of share 
ownership.”).  
 191. See id. at 982–83 (referencing activism through a proposal to 
shareholders at Dow Chemical invoking Rule 14a-8). 
 192. See Note, Proxy Rule 14a-8: Omission of Shareholder Proposals, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 700, 700–01 (1971) (“Rule 14a-8 grants to a shareholder the right 
to have a proposal which he intends to present at a stockholders’ meeting 
included by management in the corporate proxy materials.”).  
 193. See SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 513 (3d Cir. 1947) 
(identifying the specific proposals desired for presentation to the shareholders 
for action).  
 194. See Johnson, Law and Corporate Responsibility, supra note 34, at 982–
83 (describing the anti-Vietnam activism against Dow Chemical’s manufacture 
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shareholder support, and they were seen by management and 
most shareholders as an irritation.195 Then, in the 1990s, the rule 
shifted back to being a corporate governance tool, with proposals 
calling on director stock ownership, de-staggering of corporate 
boards, and majority voting by shareholders regularly gaining 
majority support.196  
How we view the corporation and its purposes is a moral 
question that we each resolve outside of our conscious attention—
and well beyond rational argumentation. The analysis, 
formulations, and clever insights that we all engage in—and 
much on display at the Symposium honoring David and Lyman—
are just ways for our tribe to bind together. If we are to change 
others’ moral matrices and perhaps our own,197 it will be by 
listening, sympathizing, reassuring, being exemplary, 
explaining—best done over dinner and drinks. This was David 
Hume’s great insight and approach to life.198 We are analogic, 
instinctive, emotional beings. And we’re very fast at it.199  
We leave the Holocene, the ten thousand years of stable 
climate and abundant resources that gave humankind farming, 
commerce, and modernity.200 And we enter the Anthropocene, 
                                                                                                     
of napalm).  
 195. See id. at 983 (noting that the resolutions received “less than 3 percent 
of the” stockholder votes).  
 196. See id. at 985 (citing Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 
88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 998–1005 (2010) (describing the decline in staggered boards 
and the rise in majority voting for directors)). 
 197. See generally HAIDT, supra note 2, at 219–366 (discussing the idea that 
“[m]orality binds and blinds”).  
 198. See The School of Life, PHILOSOPHY—David Hume, YOUTUBE (Oct. 
10, 2016) (last visited Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=HS52H_CqZLE (last visited Apr. 18, 2017) (illustrating Hume’s 
philosophy on human nature) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 199. See generally FRANK PARTNOY, WAIT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY 
(2013) (describing how we make decisions, consciously and subconsciously, often 
in milliseconds).  
 200. See Holocene Epoch, BBC NATURE, http://www.bbc.co.uk/nature/ 
history_of_the_earth/Holocene (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (“The Holocene (or 
Recent) is the current geological epoch which started some 11,500 years ago 
when the glaciers began to retreat.”) (on file with The Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
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with a destabilized climate, growing resource limits, and the 
prospect of unprecedented adaptation.201 How we become 
sustainable—that is, how we become more pluralistic in our 
decision-making—is the great question of our time.202 My Essay 
is a fumbling attempt to explain a possible path toward greater 
pluralism and sustainability thinking in corporate governance. 
                                                                                                     
 201. See Simon L. Lewis & Mark A. Maslin, Defining the Anthropocene, 
NATURE, Mar. 12, 2015, 171, at 171–78 (describing the Anthropocene as a 
potentially new geological epoch dominated by humans).  
 202. See generally DAVID W. ORR, DANGEROUS YEARS: CLIMATE CHANGE, THE 
LONG EMERGENCY, AND THE WAY FORWARD (2016) (asserting that our present 
problems result from how we make decisions and take action together after 
surveying our current climate crisis).  
